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Nadesan / SARS-CoV-2 Crisis Genealogy

In March 2020, a great medical exception to political and religious liberties
was invoked in a global “lockdown,” whereupon approximately 3 billion people were
subject to COVID-19 restrictions, according to the World Economic Forum.1 Life was
dislocated by pandemic curtailments of taken-for-granted freedoms of circulation
and congregation across the world, with unprecedented proportion, unknown effects,
and an “unrelenting horizonlessness.”2 Roland Gori contends that with the return of
epidemics, a logic of population management is being elevated over social
subjectivities as epidemiology is institutionalized as a key “new advisor of power.”3
Gori’s observation bears consideration as crises historically create opportunities for
the consolidation of power as efforts to shore up precarious assemblages of matter and
meaning include emergency declarations and statutes that suspend ordinary rights
and guarantees, including those related to social mobility and personal expression.
Jure Vujić concludes from this that a post-liberal biopolitical government is emerging
around “the imperative of fighting the invisible enemy of the ‘virus’, and not on the
ideas or democratic will.”4
In fueling cascading “exceptions” to ordinary routines, norms, and juridical
proceedings, crises prompt social sense-making. During the spring 2020 lockdowns,
the significant suspensions of civil liberties energized online discussion. In this fraught
context, heterogeneous narrative accounts of SARS-CoV-2 origins and effects
flourished online, each encoding distinct worldviews and approaches for managing
the virus and its effects.5 Crisis authorities represent the proliferation of socialsensemaking as “misinformation” threatening “truth” and institutional pandemic
controls. Yet, authorities’ efforts to present a coherent narrative foundered on
expressed uncertainties and equivocations regarding critical issues, such as the utility
of masks, risk of airborne transmission, efficacy of drugs such as Ivermectin and
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hydroxychloroquine, and the safety of vaccines, eroding trust in recommendations.6
Failed efforts at mass persuasion prompted algorithmic censorship.
Algorithms capable of censoring “conspiracy” talk about the pandemic were
advertised by those seeking to police social media sense-making.7 Accordingly, Vujić
decries "algopolitical totalitarianism," described as “a simulation of imprisonment in
various countries and beyond on a global scale, automating the repression of ‘rule
violations’ and inciting self-censorship.”8 Algorithmic control over meaning-making
presumes a uniform and invariant story of origins, effects and best practices of
governance, and yet the shifting significance of particular SARS-CoV-2 narratives,
such as the Wuhan Laboratory origins narrative, demonstrates how a once-censored
account moved from social media margins to mainstream news headlines over time.
Moreover, censorship of dissident expert views regarding pandemic policies and
treatment protocols have further eroded public trust in institutional intentions, as
observed by the nongovernmental organization, Human Rights Watch.9
Authoritarian policing of meaning breeds resistance even while relegating alternative
knowledge and experiences to the margins where outlaw narratives exert a kind of
liminal force in both containing and troubling a preferred version,10 what we might
call “the one,” following Alain Badiou.11 Although crisis communications best
practices emphasize transparency and dialogue, in practice crisis communication too
often simply aim to re-establish a disrupted institutional order.12
Crisis communications don’t simply aim to restore institutional order, but
also operate epistemically as they provide a preferred narration of crisis timelines,
characteristics, effects and governance. These narrations are inescapably political as
they reflect the intentionalities of crisis authorities conditioned by cultural
expectations, as well as exigent crisis contingencies. Drawing upon ongoing pandemic
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scholarship on expert and counter-public narratives,13 this paper represents a
genealogy elucidating the historical, cultural, and political horizons of intelligibility
for symbolic constitutions of the pandemic. I deploy Arjun Appadurai’s framework
for exploring disjunctures in global cultural flows to describe historical western
horizons of intelligibility for the present pandemic crisis and the symbolic orders
crisis representations seek to restore and/or reform.14 Western crisis “ideoscapes,” as
defined by Appadurai as “concatenations of images,” elicit particular representational
frames which are articulated in contemporary “mediascapes,” rending the invisible
viral matter of SARS-CoV-2 knowable and governable.15 Scholarship by such diverse
thinkers as Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela Richter,16 Michel Foucault,17 and Alain
Badiou18 elucidates the characteristics and relationships of our taken-for-granted
crisis ideoscapes, revealing utopian and eschatological presuppositions that deflect
attention from the politics of institutional relationships and human communities.
These crisis ideoscapes dominate contemporary mediascapes and in so doing act to
polarize audiences around contested crisis narratives. To re-assert the political nature
of crisis communications therefore requires confronting presuppositions by
thematizing the political relations among people and the irreducibility of conflicted
meanings over crisis conditions and governance.
Western Crisis Ideoscapes: Political Particularities and Dialectical
Totalization
Koselleck and Richter19 provide a seminal history of the Western concept of crisis and
in so doing excavate an ideoscape steeped paradoxically in the particularities of
politics, religious eschatology, and the Enlightenment world view, all of which provide
horizons of intelligibility for the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic origins, disease syndrome
and social effects. These authors begin with an etymology of origins anchored in
ancient Greek meanings, which were expressed in the spheres of law, medicine, and
theology and were rooted in the verbs to separate, choose, judge, decide, quarrel or
fight. These significations emphasized political conflict, the exigency of decisionNadesan, “Crisis Narratives.”
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making, and the momentousness of decisions in shaping future conditions.
Significations of judgment, trial, and legal decision prevailed also with the Romans,
but crisis was additionally inflected to include a “point in time in which a decision is
due but has not yet been rendered.”20 The important take-aways from this early
formulation are that political conflict is an inescapable dimension of crisis and that
deliberative procedures are critical for achieving agreement on paths forward.
The early relationship between crisis and politics mutates as the ancient Greek
and Roman meanings of crisis were extended to the sphere of medicine, as developed
in the Corpus Hippocraticum and by the Roman scholar-doctor-philosopher Galen (12999). The medical view of crisis designated observable conditions and stressed the
expert’s judgment (judicium) regarding the patient’s survival and in doing so
combined “objective” analysis of disease symptoms with the “subjective” authority of
expertise.21 Medical judgment delineated between (1) perfect and imperfect crises in
the medical sphere, with the latter designating potential relapse; and (2) between
acute and chronic crises. European medical texts began referencing this medical sense
of crisis in the 14th century, but the extrapolated idea of a medical crisis applied to the
“body politic” did not occur until the early 1600s, as shall be discussed presently. What
is key to this medicalized formulation of crisis, whether applied to the patient or the
body politic, is that the early emphasis on politics is replaced by the authority of
expert judgment.
Politics continues to recede in the Old and New Testament as God’s judgment
of His people is emphasized. Judgment “contains a promise of salvation” and
subsequently acquires eschatological significance with the belief that the end-time
crisis will deliver the “Last Judgment (xpigtl-/krisis = judicium), whose hour, time, and
place remained unknown but whose inevitability is certain.”22 Within the JudeoChristian tradition, crisis denotes judgment in a linear temporality that diverges
significantly from the eternally recurring cycles of the Greek and Roman philosophies.
Time in early Christianity flows from creation to a final and divine event, the
“eschaton.”23 Although some early believers feared apocalypse as “an imminent
cataclysmic intervention by God in history,” others viewed the end of time as a
promise of radical change and revelation with the possibility of deliverance in the
form of heaven on Earth.24 Hence, end times imaginaries can be distinguished based
Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 361.
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on whether they promote messianism or katechontism, where the former emphasizes
human agency in accelerating delivery of the utopian promise of salvation, while the
latter seeks to postpone the end time through directed human agency.25 Across
Christian end time imaginaries, Koselleck and Richter describe a tension between the
Apocalypse anticipated by faith and experienced as “already present” and the
irreducible openness of the end “as a cosmic event” even while taking place within
one’s own consciousness.26 The articulated relationships across crisis, spiritual
awakenings and last days become firmly entrenched in the Western religious and
cultural imaginaries, as shall be discussed at greater length presently.
However, what Koselleck and Richter emphasize is the linear view of
temporality that emerges in the early modern period and the grand narrative of a
common history that get articulated around this linear temporality. In the author’s
preface to Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, Koselleck observed that the
collective concept of “history” was coined in the eighteenth century and henceforth
organizes “specific dispositions and ways of assimilating experience” that reflect
“Enlightenment reflection on the growing complexity of ‘history in general,’ in which
the determinations of experience are increasingly removed from experience itself.”27
In Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Koselleck
argues for a link between the “origins of the modern philosophy of history and the
start of the crisis which, initially in Europe, has been determining political events even
since 1789.”28 Koselleck sees the generalized concept of history as universalizing and
naturalizing European bourgeoisie values, especially Utopianism.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, history gets transformed into a “sort of
legal process” whereby the “tribunal of reason” subsumes by critique “all regions
touched by criticism.”29 Eschatology “recoils into Utopianism” as the Cartesian cogito
ergo sum sheds religious encumbrances.30 Yet, Koselleck argues that this idea that
“history is open to planning” is a misconception because the construct of history itself
is detached from the historical particularities of politics, bound as it is to
“Utopianism” and the “Absolutist State.”31 In sum, Koselleck sees a singular view of
Dillon, Michael. “Specters of Biopolitics: Finitude, Eschaton, and Katechon.” South Atlantic Quarterly
110, no. 3 (2011): 780–92.
26
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history emerging around 1789 that is indebted to older juridical and medical views of
crisis, but extrapolated to the social body. The social body is given a semblance of
unity through articulation of a common history, thought spiritually or in relation to
bourgeoisie values, such as Utopianism, but the impossibility of symbolic closure
delivers inescapable crisis. Crisis is inevitable because of a systematically distorted
representational system disconnected by abstraction from political particularities.
Abstracted and curated crisis ideoscapes are particularly amenable to the political
machinations of those who can control them.
Koselleck’s concerns about the emergence of a singular modern history is
generally consistent with Michel Foucault’s critique of the “Age of History,” argues
Elías Palti in an interesting comparison of thinkers.32 However, Palti contends that
Koselleck overly abstracts and simplifies crisis typologies by eliding counter-historical
temporalities and the complex circulations of politics across medical formulations of
crisis. Koselleck’s formulation especially depoliticizes medical crisis with an
objectivist interpretation that erases politics in producing medical meaning and
naively assumes a sort of detached objectivity among experts. Sergei Prozorov agrees
with Palti’s critique, arguing for the superiority of Foucault’s governmental approach
to crisis, describing it as better adapted to unravelling the power relations implicit in
crisis identification and expert governance:
Foucault chooses to approach crisis as a ‘juridico-political’ matrix of
decisive judgement which could be applied in much the same way in
medicine and law. . . after all, it is the authority of the doctor that
permits the identification of a crisis and the possibility of incorrect
identification places this authority in question, paving the way for its
contestation.33
Prozorov hones in on the role of institutional authority in constructing crisis,
illustrating this point by describing in Foucauldian terms how the psychiatric hospital
opened a space for madness, which was rendered in and out of being by medical
expertise.34 As Foucault explained in The Birth of the Clinic, “Before it is removed from
the density of the body, disease is given an organization, hierarchized into families,
genera, and species” and this “classificatory medicine” presupposes a certain
‘configuration’ of disease” and produces “tertiary spatialization,” defined as the
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techniques of medical investment and control.35 The lessons learned from these
critiques is the inescapability of politics in all crisis formulations, especially when
extrapolated to the social body and the historical trend toward extrapolating crisis to
a homogenized social body while elevating expert judgement in its determination.
Notwithstanding nuanced differences in their political interpretations and
extensions of medical crisis, Koselleck and Foucault share the view that totalizing
views of history that articulate crisis in terms of utopian unfoldings elide historical
complexities and turbulence, that is, the material politics of the early modern period.
In Critique and Crisis, Koselleck points to Thomas Paine’s (1736-1809) writings as
exemplifying this shift in temporal paradigm toward a uniform and teleological view
of history.36 Paine’s “The Crisis” was printed as a series of pamphlets, the first
published in the Pennsylvania Journal on December 19, 1776, as George Washington
retreated from British forces across the Delaware River. At the war’s close, in 1783,
Paine penned The Crisis 13, wherein he emphasized America’s revealed moral
superiority and in so doing articulated the conflict between the colonists and British
troops as having derived from a “moral crisis.”37 Accordingly, Koselleck represents
Paine as exalting America’s revolutionary pedagogy in a universalizing history of
moral development, an interpretation grounded in the following passage from Paine:
THE times that tried men's souls,"* are over—and the greatest and
completest revolution the world ever knew, gloriously and happily
accomplished. . . . To see it in our power to make a world happy—to
teach mankind the art of being so—to exhibit, on the theatre of the
universe a character hitherto unknown—and to have, as it were, a new
creation intrusted to our hands, are honors that command reflection,
and can neither be too highly estimated, nor too gratefully received.38
For Koselleck and Foucault, a totalizing era of common history had begun.
Accordingly, Koselleck and Richter observe that in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the medical concept of crisis was “applied to the ‘body politics’
or to its constituent parts,” engendering significations including a nation’s
constitutional survival, heightened tensions within and among nations, and military
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conflict and war.39 Crisis derives from the political unrest of the nascent body politic,
but is subsumed within a grand view of history whose “events” disclose historical
processes and mark assertion of liberal rights of personhood, and whose “trajectory”
is synthesized in a kind of spiritual Manifest Destiny.
The early 1800s were especially fraught with crisis as this language was widely
deployed to describe complex juridical, economic, political and spiritual issues and
challenges of the times. There were recurrent silver, commercial, agricultural and
labor crises. Yet, despite the particularities of politics, the political crisis of the rights
of man was made eschatological and evangelical in anti-slavery texts of the Second
Great Awakening. For example, Julia Ward Howe’s (1861) “The Battle Hymn of the
Republic,” commences with the end time event – “Mine eyes have seen the glory of
the coming of the Lord” – and emphasizes judgment: “He has sounded forth the
trumpet that shall never call retreat; He is sifting out the hearts of men before his
judgment seat.”40 Likewise, Eugen Weber (1999) observes in Apocalypses: Prophecies,
Cults and Millennial Beliefs Throughout the Ages that Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851) believed in the Second Coming, considering its imminence a
distinct possibility, and felt with others of her time that only through abolishing
slavery could the U.S. achieve its millennial calling.41
The eschatological and totalizing horizon of intelligibility for crisis informed
nineteenth-century social theory as well, overcoding the particularities of politics. For
example, Karl Marx’s 1887 critique of political grappled with material politics, such as
the economic crises of 1825 and 1830,42 and monetary crises, which derive from the
crises of the commodity form.43 However, Marx ultimately subsumed crisis
particularities in the dialectical synthesis. In footnote 50, Marx distinguished the
formal monetary crisis that is a “phase of every [capitalist] crisis” from the historically
specific “particular form of crisis,” limited to industry and commerce and pivoting on
moneyed capital, banking, the stock exchange, and finance.44 Marx prioritized the
importance of the “generalized monetary crisis” because he saw it as deriving from
formal contradictions in the capitalist value system: “In a crisis, the antithesis between
commodities and their value-form, money, becomes heightened into an absolute

Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 362.
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contradiction.”45 The absolute contradiction is akin to the medicalized crisis of the
body politic, resolved through the dialectical resolution of formerly incompatible
political particularities in a totalizing synthesis, a transcendent new form of social
organization.
Agency also is subsumed by the imperatives of the dialectical synthesis. Yet, a
radical disjuncture emerges between crisis and awareness that stalls the inevitable and
Hegelian progress of history. A collective consciousness of capitalism’s structural
contradictions is a prerequisite for revolution, and hence crisis plays an indispensable
role in sundering the veil of ideology, positioning the newly conscious as agents of
history. This imaginary invokes eschatological themes, which are repeatedly rejected
by Marxist scholarship, yet refuse to be put to rest entirely, as described by Roland
Boer, who explored the persistent idea of Marxism as a form of secularized
messianism. Boer explains: “Jewish and Christian thought has influenced the Marxist
narrative of history, which is but a pale copy of its original: the evils of the present age
with its alienation and exploitation (sin) will be overcome by the proletariat
(collective redeemer), who will usher in a glorious new age when sin is overcome, the
unjust are punished, and the righteous inherit the earth.”46 Boer rejects such a
simplistic formulation but observes that early French socialist thought may have
influenced both Marx’s and Engels’s utopian thoughts about communism.
In the twentieth century, conservative social theorist Francis Fukuyama's The
End of History and the Last Man argues, as its title suggests, that history has achieved
closure in the form of a (near) universal and homogeneous state founded in the
doublet of the free market and liberal democracy.47 The historical trajectory of crisis
has ended, the argument goes, because capitalism has overcome its dialectical other
and promises to achieve near-universal recognition for each particular in their
individuality. Although Fukuyama recognizes the imperfection of modern liberal
democratic states, he argues that they constitute the ideal social form for satisfying
the universal desire named thymos, a soulful drive for individual recognition.48
Fukuyama’s “end of history” is indebted to Kojève’s interpretation of Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) philosophy of history, which posited a master-slave
dialectic as motivating historical developments toward an idealized state in which
universal recognition would be achieved for all in their individuality (signifying the

Marx, Capital, 236.
Roland Boer, “Marxism and Eschatology Reconsidered,” Mediations 25, no. 1 (2010): 39.
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dialectical reconciliation of universality and particularity).49 While that state looked
for Hegel much like the German one, Kojève felt that twentieth century capitalism
marked the ultimate synthesis, the end of dialectical struggle, and the death of “man,”
if s/he is defined in relation to change-oriented actions.50 For Kojève, the end of
history is not necessarily a utopian moment, as illustrated by his deeply ambivalent
assessment of the dangers of bureaucratic and technocratic forms of life on human
consciousness. However, in contrast to Kojève’s pessimism, Fukuyama in 1992
affirmed what he saw as the end of history in the hegemony of the Western, modern
liberal capitalist democracy, described as lacking “externality,” or fundamental limits
to its sovereignty.51
In Specters of Marx, Derrida writes vehemently against the totalizing idea of
the end of history:
For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to
neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has
finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence,
inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected
as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity . . .
no degree of progress allows us to ignore that never before, in absolute
figures, never have so many men, women, and children been
subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth.52
Arguing against totalization, Derrida draws on Hamlet to invoke the sense that time
is “disarticulated, dislocated, time is run down, on the run and run down”; it is
“deranged, both out of order and mad.”53 The time is out of joint.54 Shorn of a
philosophy of history, crisis loses teleology and transcendent significance. Each crisis
is therefore rendered discrete and particular and polysemous in its politics,
challenging social efforts to draw generalized meanings from, and control over, the
deranged happenstances of reverberating events. What is required is an alternative
formulation or imaginary freed of a teleological logic fueled by crisis. Yet, the
positivist responses to the problems of the philosophy of history present other
limitations in conceptualizing crisis.

Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Ithaca:
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20th-Century Crisis: Event-Process and the Problem of the One
Anglo-American twentieth-century historians rejected the continent’s philosophy of
history in favor of a positivist reading of events defined methodologically by
empiricism and focused on such questions as the appropriateness of covering laws and
the relationship between historical knowledge and evidence, with little to no interest
in such matters as the meaning and recurring structural forms of history.55 A good
example is provided in Robert Kutak’s “Sociology of Crisis: The Louisville Flood of
1937” which articulates universal crisis “elements” and the necessities of functional
organizational responses to them.56 Crisis was domesticated in the depths of the Great
Depression by identifying generalizable elements, precursors and stages and
developing planned responses for modeled risks, rendering crisis malleable to human
engineering. This same formula of responding, anticipating and pre-empting crises of
the body politic, or nation-state, informed Progressive institutions and post-WWII
Keynesian economics.
Positivism’s domination of the post-WWII U.S. academy encouraged
encyclopedia-style crisis typifications and taxonomies and promoted cybernetic
“learning logics” for reigning in the catastrophic military-industrial forces unleashed
by modernity. Distanced in time from the experienced and mediated horrors of
WWII, late-twentieth-century scientific institutions sanitized crisis from
eschatological ideoscapes using precise crisis taxonomies and covering laws.
Christophe Roux-Dufort offers a concise synopsis of two commonly invoked
contemporary crisis typifications: event and process views of crisis.57 The event
approach emphasizes harmful or hazardous incidents or accidents, defined in relation
to impacts and damages and triggered by events whose properties (e.g., event phases)
and probabilities are intensely dissected. In contrast to the narrowed temporality of
the event approach, process approaches are temporally protracted, seeing crisis as
tending to emerge in distinct phases, such as warning signals, triggering events, acute
phases, amplifications, and resolutions. The observer’s task is to capture the unfolding
complexities of crisis preconditions and consequences across time, often by discerning
latent patterns, whose identification can enable cybernetic control over conditions by
applying lessons learned from previous crises of the same type.
Daniel Little, “Philosophy of History,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N.
Zalta (2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/history/.
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Epistemological problems trouble both formulations, which together
presuppose the event, the crisis, within naively objectivist terms. Roux-Dufort
navigates this tension as he transforms the event approach to crisis using the language
of weak signals. Weak signals are believed to hold “fragments of the future that,
properly decoded, enable one to grasp the essence of forthcoming changes”58 RouxDufort acknowledges that this formulation presumes a given future event and then
attributes precursor signs to it, which seems to reintroduce a teleological imperative,
but nonetheless insists on the disclosive power of weak signals in developing his idea
of crisis as both accidental and revelatory:
For the idea that signs could herald the turning point prompts us to
make a connection between the accidental nature and the revelatory
character of a crisis, that is, between an event-based perspective that
views the triggering event as a starting point, and a perspective that
considers the event as the end point of a previously unknown
destabilizing dynamic (Sagan, 1997). A crisis is clearly unpredictable,
unusual, and extraordinary, and is by nature accidental. After the
crisis, nothing can be the same. It marks a turning point and, to a
certain extent, a suspension of time. In this sense, it is both unique and
decisive. Above all, it acts as a rift between past and future. It
transcends the present and reconfigures the field of future
possibilities.59
Crisis suspends time between past and future, allowing analysis of turning points
thought as “meeting” points between “the before, when one is often unaware of what
might be in the offing, and the after, when one is often convulsed by discovering it.”60
Although “inassimilable” in their entirety, weak signals help read crises and in so doing
transform meanings and hold the potential for transforming crisis event trajectories.
Roux-Dufort’s eloquent existential phenomenology is a welcome escape from
positivism as it attempts to reconcile subjective and objective components of crisis,
centering human agency in interpreting and transforming crisis conditions. The
dynamics of his process resonate intuitively with personal experience, but the
collective sense-making by institutions centered in his weak signals approach risks
producing homogenized and totalizing crisis articulations that can reproduce
power/knowledge hierarchies. Alain Badiou challenges us to interrogate that process
of producing a unified meaning by deconstructing the very idea of “the one.” Badiou
Roux-Dufort, “Delving into the Roots of Crises,” 31.
Roux-Dufort, “Delving into the Roots of Crises,” 32.
60
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argues in Being and Event that “What has to be declared is that the one, which is not,
solely exists as operation. In other words: there is no one, only the count-as-one.”61
Badiou’s complex philosophy escapes a simple synopsis but the point made here is well
taken: The constitution of the event in the singular is an operation, it is literally
created by collapsing multiplicity. A “situation” is “any presented multiplicity” and its
order is the one, which is an inescapable social fabrication.
20th Century Crisis Mediascapes and the Problem of the One
The Western crisis ideoscape, constituted by an assemblage of conflicting ideas and
images, was incorporated and curated in twentieth-century media imaginaries, what
Appadurai refers to as mediascapes, which narrated the particularities of “news” events,
but also re-asserted through distinct codings eschatological representations of crisis.62
In particular, a homogeneous and totalizing ideoscape of Anglo-American Western
history was narrated in significant part by the news media, public relations, and
advertising industries, beginning in earnest after World War I, when radio and print
circulated widely in domestic spaces and early film had captured public imaginations.
In opening Public Opinion (1922), Walter Lippmann observes, in “The World Outside
and the Pictures in our Heads,” that “Looking back we can see how indirectly we know
the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see that the news of it comes
to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat
as if it were the environment itself.”63 For Edward Bernays, the capacity for mediated
information to create social reality represented great political and economic
opportunities. Bernays’ Propaganda, first published in 1928, offered practitioners in
industry and government a practical guide to deploying propaganda. His promotional
practices inspired social engineering campaigns designed to bring about change in
consumer habits, worldviews, beliefs, and attitudes by appealing to unconscious
desires and anxieties.64 Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) Manufacturing Consent provided
the late-twentieth-century critics’ update on the eschatological ideoscape of U.S.
manifest destiny.65 These disparate thinkers explored the possibilities for common
history to be engineered for the purpose of social control using mass media
technologies.
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Mass-mediated representations of history are often calculated representations
designed to produce preferred audiences. Crisis emerged as a tool in the arsenal of
twentieth-century opinion makers, as so brilliantly described in Naomi Klein’s Shock
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, which explores the engineering of consent
around crisis interpretations and policies.66 Klein is particularly focused on humanengineered institutional crises deriving from a kind of economic and social sabotage,
as illustrated by systematic underfunding of public health in the U.S., which results in
organizational failures whose ruptures are exploited and managed by the new opinion
leaders.
Managing crisis meanings assumed even more significance in the hyperconnectivity and productivity of the Internet era. Despite fostering the proliferation
of meanings, the Internet offered unprecedented opportunities for surveillance and
micro-targeting, as illustrated compellingly by the Cambridge Analytica scandal,
which claimed the capacity to make ads more persuasive by tailoring them to
individuals’ personality characteristics using data on demographics, purchases, voting
behavior, etc., including data harvested from 87 million Facebook users.67 Social media
seduce by promising to salve that burning need for recognition that Fukuyama called
thymos. Yet, human agency online is circumscribed by platform protocols, algorithms
and trained human judges who emerge as key arbitrators of online truths, ordering
and reigning in multiplicity, often using crude logical codes, such as true/false and
trustworthy/not-trustworthy, that require elaborate simplifications.
Abstracted and mediated, contemporary crises and their histories are
hyperrealities in the Baudrillardian sense. Although the semiotics of meaning
production have always been deluded by the assumption of a primary reflection (the
“mirror” view of meaning), contemporary mediated semiosis is hyperreal in the sense
that the requirements of reference to the real have been substituted by a selfreferential hypertextuality: “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential
being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality:
a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory—precession of simulacra—that
engenders the territory. . . .”68 The Internet facilitates social sense-making, and
narratives circulate there unhinged from the demands of empiricism. Some narratives
were created by individuals—prophets, whistleblowers, and shills—while others
Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).
Sam Schechner, Jenny Gross, and Rebecca Ballhaus, “Firms’ Profiling of Voters Didn’t Work, Clients
Say,” The Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2018, p. A9.
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reflect the stories of speech communities of believers. Still other narratives were
planted by institutional agents with calculated efforts toward propagandization.
These disinformation narratives often yield to classical and realist tests of knowledge,
but deflect such inquiry by their affective hooks designed to produce emotional
identification, rather than intellectual engagement.
SARS-CoV-2 Crisis and the Failures of the One
Efforts to police truth in this prolific Internet context operate in binary fashion,
coding selected data as information (truth) or disinformation. Badiou’s engagement
with set theory illuminates the problem of efforts to bracket a singular truth: the
constitution of the event, as such, entails a logic of unification, resulting in inescapable
typification. Within the hegemonic SARS-CoV-2 crisis narrative, the ordering
principle was expressed in the overarching imperative for the articulation of a
universal account of zoonotic, or animal-derived origins, and expert, Zero-COVID
containment. Yet, the very act of defining a viral outbreak was a technocratic
operation occurring through an uneasy assemblage of government and private
institutions. Early articulations of a novel coronavirus created symbolic sequencing unity
out of viral multiplicities derived from clinical sampling and did so by assigning the
multiplicity to a pre-existing coronavirus set and excluding inconvenient genetic
sequencing in order to assert a singular story of certitude regarding origins.
On February 3, 2020, the scientific journal Nature published two of the first
genetic studies on what was then described as the “novel coronavirus.” The first study
was led by Fan Wu and was titled, “A New Coronavirus Associated with Human
Respiratory Disease in China.”69 The second study was led by Peng Zhou and was
titled, “A Pneumonia Outbreak Associated with a New Coronavirus of Probable Bat
Origin.”70 Each study separately offered ontological certitude with the genetic
sequence of the newly discovered coronavirus. However, careful reconstruction of the
history of the Wu publication reveals political particularities. In early January 2020
before the Nature publications, the genetic sequence was pre-published on preprint
server bioRvix and GenBank, an open-access data repository, by Wu and researchers
from the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre, with Zhang Yongzhen listed as first

Fan Wu et al., “A New Coronavirus Associated with Human Respiratory Disease in China,” Nature
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author.71 The Zhang–Wu team had reported sequencing results to China’s National
Health Commission, but subsequently posted them online after the commission’s
failure to act on their recommendations for control. In seeming retaliation, Zhang’s
Shanghai centre was promptly ordered to close for “rectification” by the Shanghai
Health Commission.72 Despite this rectification, the team’s genetic sequence was
updated twice, with the second version posted January 14, 2020, and a third version
updated January 18.73 Authorship of the final and peer-reviewed version published in
Nature on February 3 included two new authors (Ming-Li Yuan and Edward Holmes).74
On pages 270-273 of the same Nature issue, the second publication of SARS-CoV-2
genetic sequencing appears, led by Peng Zhou and including Zheng Li Shi, both of the
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens, Wuhan Institute of Virology. Although
alleging zoonotic origins, Peng Zhou and Zheng Li Shi subsequently figured
prominently in online conspiratorial sense-making regarding SARS-CoV-2’s alleged
provenance as a genetically-engineered virus escaped from the Wuhan lab.75
The successively published sequences detailed above stoked international
controversy over early viral characteristics and origins that could not be resolved
because China had ordered all viral samples to be destroyed in late December 2019,
leaving no material traces for subsequent verification.76 Furthermore, genetic
sequence data that had been archived in the preprint server bioRvix by the Zhang–
Wu team was discovered to have been removed in June 2020 per the researchers’
request.77 Although the erasure of data heightened criticism of China’s role in the
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pandemic, documents from the National Institutes of Health obtained by The
Intercept through a FOIA request in 2021 pointed to U.S. funding of gain-of-function
research at the Wuhan lab.78 The idea of a primordial genetic sequence of the
pandemic virus, now designated as SARS-CoV-2, is revealed as an inescapably
political operation, in the sense described by Badiou,79 by these revelations. Symbolic
excesses have precluded closure and control from the very first efforts to code the viral
genome, revealing behind-the-scenes agendas and the global operations of
institutional power.
Foucault and Koselleck share the view that the political particularities of crisis
meanings are selectively ignored and/or assimilated teleologically in relation to a
totalizing narrative, a grand, singular truth-telling. For Koselleck, this master
narrative delivers inescapable crisis because it has become detached from the
particularities of politics. For example, a technological-utopic narrative of zoonotic
disease transfer, identification, and containment was implicitly promised through the
masterful achievements of viral surveillance and sequencing heralded by these Nature
publications. However, this institutional narrative of control was beset by crisis as it
failed to resonate with ongoing appearances, including the series of successive
publications, unexplained lab rectification, missing data, and hint of international
intrigue. Although the very definition of the crisis as “pandemic” invokes established
expertise and strategies of governance, the failure of “the one”—the approved set—
points to the inescapable role of politics power/knowledge assemblages.
The pandemic mediascape is a heterogeneous “concatenation of images” and
memes whose messy representations are ordered by crisis logics of technoepidemiological control, even while unravelling in semiotic and viral excesses. Medical
authorities and institutions stand in judgment (judicium), combining their “objective”
analysis of the COVID-19 disease syndrome, origins, and trajectories with their
“subjective” authority, seeking to articulate a unified meta-narrative of the virus, its
biological effects and governance. Yet, expert certitude has been undermined by restatements and surprises, as illustrated in a comment made by Dr. Gregory Poland,
President of the U.S. Armed Forces Epidemiological Board and Professor of Medicine
at Mayo Clinic Rochester: “This virus has very peculiar immunological secrets
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78
Sharon Lerner, Mara Hvistendahl, Maia Hibbett, “NIH Documents Provide New Evidence U.S.
Funded Gain-of-Function Research in Wuhan,” The Intercept, September 9, 2021,
https://theintercept.com/2021/09/09/covid-origins-gain-of-functionresearch/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=The%20Intercept%20Newsletter.
79
Badiou, Being and Event, 24.

communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 8
17

Nadesan / SARS-CoV-2 Crisis Genealogy

wrapped up inside it.”80 Therefore, there exists an unresolved tension between the
sheer proliferation of viral meanings and the modernist requirement that crisis be
subsumed teleologically to expert human control.
It is important to acknowledge that the ordering imperative is not merely
propagandistic, as it is deeply rooted in cultural imaginaries, what Appadurai defines
as historicized ideoscapes, which play critical roles in the identification, classification,
interpretation and response to crisis.81 Delf Rothe demonstrates this point in his
explication of the “Anthropocene,” a posited human-engineered extinction event,
represented with respect to a “linear temporality and a common orientation towards
the threat of the end of time.”82 Rothe delineates three distinct discourses of the
Anthropocene: ecocatastrophism, the most ubiquitous of the discourses, illustrated in
work by Thomas Malthus83 and Paul R. Ehrlich84 and characterized by a narrative “of
planetary emergency management through new forms of ‘Earth system stewardship’”;85
eco-modernism, a cybernetic learning discourse, articulating human responsibility and
technological capacities in evading end times through the heroic planetary engineer
whose local sustainability projects and planetary terraforming forestalls apocalypse;
and planetary realism, distinguished by pessimism regarding planetary governance, but
invoking resilience for managing complexity and uncertainty. Planetary realism’s nod
to indigenous knowledge as illustrating perfected, albeit historicized, adaptations to
local conditions too often represents a cynical appropriation where indigenous forms
of knowledge are valued only to the extent they can be appropriated by white people
to “guarantee their own survival.”86 Eschatology resonates across these and other
discourses of the Anthropocene, as Scott Hamilton points out, suggesting that this reinscription essentially shuts down the indefinite time of an open future and in doing
so “re-governmentalises the cosmos, by fusing sovereignty and history back on to a
singular pathway leading to the world’s end in planetary catastrophe. This ‘end of our
Quentin Fottrell, “Asymptomatic Transmission of Coronavirus Appears to be Worse than SARS or
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world’ encloses time back into a definite linear historicity – a looming end that all
must share – which implies the end of modern indefinite governmentality, the state,
and even history itself.”87
The aforementioned discourses of the Anthropocene map surprisingly well
onto the SARS-CoV-2 mediascape and govern meaning-making in predictable ways.
Ecocatastrophism can be seen as informing the representational logic of zoonotic
disease transfer and global transmission, while experimental mRNA “jabs” and
boosters are represented as an innovative crisis management technology. Likewise,
eco-modernism informs virus hygiene, masking and distancing campaigns, whose
expert messaging and pedagogies nudge behavior with ceaselessly updated “best
practices.” Finally, planetary realism, which is distinguished by pessimism regarding
viral governance, can be seen in public health authorities’ expressed concerns about
ungovernable human and viral conduct, which justify crisis interventions in local
circumstances, as illustrated by the previously unthinkable global “lockdowns.”
Planetary realism resonates most profoundly as it captures experts’
equivocations and uncertainties and the surprising presentations of viral mutations
that have precluded containment of SARS-CoV-2 in a reassuring crisis narrative, “the
one” of technological mastery over nature. A year into the “pandemic” timeline, these
excesses trouble the operation of the one expert narrative of accidental zoonotic
disease transfer, scientific/medical discovery, and governmental containment through
surveillance, quarantine and vaccination. Signifiers such as COVID-19; mRNA
Vaccines; SARS-Co-V-2; B.1.351 (UK); P.1 (Brazil); E484K (mutation); L452R; chimeric
virus; Wuhan wet market; Wuhan Lab (there are three); Fort Detrick; Event 101; 5G;
“Scamdemic;” and “clotshot” circulate virally, often in intensely abstracted and memelike forms . Ephemeral presentations of viral matter and meaning are ungovernable
multiplicities resisting symbolic and algorithmic containment across institutional and
virtual spaces. The impossibility of “the one” is experienced as dislocation and
derangement. As Derrida said, the time is out of joint.
SARS-CoV-2 material and symbolic excesses belie twentieth-century
technological Utopianism and nineteenth-century optimism encoded in the
dialectically prophesied end of History. Erosion of the grand Enlightenment narrative
of zoonotic disease transfer and containment will likely invigorate eschatology. Bereft
of the modernist promise, end-time crisis ideoscapes may flourish, seeing the “Last
Judgment” (xpigtl-/krisis = judicium) in the temporal dislocations of viral matter (i.e.,
87
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mutations) and meanings whose unravellings can only be brought together again in
the (one) cataclysm of “eschaton.”88 The complex temporality of eschatological crisis
already inscribed in contemporary formulations of planetary crisis will no doubt
energize efforts both to bring about the desired end times and to preclude it through
radical and authoritarian means.89 The former messianic approach was pursued in
South Korea by the religious group Shincheonji, whose name signifies “new heaven
and earth,” with reference to the Book of Revelation, and whose leader seeks to create
a “new spiritual Israel” at the end time.90 Religious SARS-CoV-2 messianism of this
form articulates against scientific-medical katechontism. Whereas messianism
emphasizes human agency in accelerating delivery of the utopian promise of salvation,
katechontism seeks to postpone the projected end time through directed human
agency and technologies. For example, scientific-medical katechontism articulates
mRNA vaccination as the pivotal point de capiton; that is, as the major signifier
securing meaning and matter against the tide of SARS-CoV-2 derangement through
the establishment of a new biopolitical order, a new vaccine apartheid, that
prohibitively restricts mobilities and economic opportunities. Although seeped in
positivist philosophy, scientific-medical mediascapes can reinscribe eschatology, as
illustrated in Los Angeles Times coverage of an emergent “California” strain of SARSCoV-2: “‘The devil is already here,’ said Dr. Charles Chiu, who led the UCSF team of
geneticists, epidemiologists, statisticians and other scientists in a wide-ranging
analysis of a new variant, which they call B.1.427/B.1.429. ‘I wish it were different. But
the science is the science.’”91 The science is the science that tells the world the devil is
here.
The Time is Out of Joint
The most concerning aspect of the homogenization of “the one” is that it poses
inescapable problems for civil society and democracy more generally. Although the
formal concept of “a people,” unified by core constitutional values, history, and a
shared vision for the future, is foundational to nationhood, it is ultimately another
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fictional unification that masks the inherent conflicts of interest and power relations
endemic to all human societies and endeavors, including scientific ones. Following
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, it is instructive to consider constitutions of the
people as ephemeral articulations reflecting shifting alliances enacted
communicatively.92 Broad constitutions of the people unifying disparate groups are
often organized by negations, as illustrated by the populist constitution of the people
against societal elites controlling salient reins of power. Distrust of elites unifies
otherwise disparate groups, forging equivalences across political particularities. The
populist articulation of the people against elites is powerfully destabilizing, and elites
will work to re-channel political affect by controlling hegemonic narratives and
redirecting targets of outrage. Controlling affective flows is regarded as critical to
contemporary crisis management, and the capacity to create hyperrealities
disconnected from experience has never been greater for those able to regulate online
access and content. However, as Foucault instructed us, control meets resistance and
hence even the most sophisticated algorithms of control can be outwitted by human
creativity when the goal is sharing alternative knowledge and experiences.
This author’s findings on populist SARS-CoV-2 narratives disclosed
increasing social distress in online platforms as algorithmic censors interfered with
individuals’ efforts to share alternative pandemic narratives across 2021 and as news
media, such as Politico, reported that “Biden allied groups, including the Democratic
National Committee” planned to “engage fact-checkers more aggressively and work
with SMS carriers to dispel misinformation about vaccines that is sent over social
media and text messages.”93 The apparent arbitrary shifting of mainstream and expert
accounts of origins and mask policy reinforced counter-speech narratives, as did
shifting rules for censorship of references to the “Wuhan lab” on social media sites
such as Reddit.94 The pandemic paradigm of lockdowns, social-media censorship, and
concerted media control amplified alienation and empowered resistance narratives,
and in no area were those narratives more affectively charged than with respect to
mandatory vaccinations. The authoritarian “jab” has emerged as both a new line of
force and rallying call against perceived medical/scientific and governmental tyranny.
Populist outrage expressed in social media comments on alternative platforms
grew as institutional authorities were obliged to acknowledge growing vaccine
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: New Left, 1985).
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injuries, including life-threatening blood clots and myocarditis among young people.95
Algorithmic censorship of confusing and or adverse personal vaccine experiences on
social media, such as heavy menstrual periods,96 amplified concerns about vaccineinduced sterilization as a component of a mass-depopulation campaign. Institutional
media campaigning for vaccination as a “patriotic” act97 disqualified the unvaccinated
as good citizens, while the polarizing comment by Anthony Fauci, Director of the U.S.
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, of "two Americas"98 emerging
around the dualism of vaccinated/unvaccinated was interpreted as signaling
institutional war against them in online discussion forums.99 Censorship of vaccine
criticism by YouTube100 and targeting of dissident experts, such as occurred with the
cancellation and reinstatement of the LinkedIn profile of a co-inventor of mRNA
vaccines, Robert Malone,101 who has long studied genetic vectors,102 added credence to
an eschatological counter-public narrative of the “great reset.” The great reset is a
unifying trope representing a final war of depopulation perpetrated by elites and their
mad-scientist lackeys against the people, whom are left bare without liberal
protections of self-ownership and free expression. In a bizarre temporal coincidence,
the British pandemic miniseries Utopia provided the great reset lexicon, as a global
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elite termed “The Network” are represented as orchestrating a weaponized pandemic
in order to sterilize and cull the global population.103 Although initially broadcast in
the U.K. in 2013-2014, the re-release of this series on streaming services in 2020
articulated a narrative that provided an alternative frame of intelligibility for the
unassimilable pandemic elements pondered in conspiratorial online sense-making.
It is a grand crisis in the making wrought by pre-existing institutional
inequalities, failed and authoritarian pandemic governance and a triggering agent, the
mysterious SARS-CoV-2. A zero-COVID104 narrative logic promoting virus
eradication through novel technologies and strict lockdowns on material and
symbolic flows has taken hold as “the one,” coding all opposition as disinformation.
An intervention is demanded at the end of history. Crisis must be freed from the
reigns of teleology and, following Koselleck and Richter, be acknowledged in relation
to political particularities. Crisis must be acknowledged to be constituted in and
through multiple expert frameworks and experiential points of view that challenge
the “tertiary” power of medical police.105 In “The Time is Out of Joint: Temporal
Disorders in the Late Modern Condition,” Walter Moser suggests multiplicity as the
antidote for contemporary temporal disorders, which are “increasingly unavoidable
symptoms of a crisis of the modern temporality. This crisis might then prepare the
stage for a different temporality, or rather for a plural emergence of temporal
alternatives.”106 The plural emergence of temporal alternatives? What could that
mean?
Crisis scholarship can either reinforce a totalizing, albeit internally fractured,
narrative through endless schematics of control or can alternatively seek to
understand and help build bridges enabling respectful disagreement around the
contestations of political particularities. Rather than taking for granted “the one”
produced by societal time-keepers, scholarship should acknowledge the multiverse of
interpretive and societal possibilities. Instead of prioritizing the doomed quest for
transcendent truths in meanings and matter, many in communication studies address

Dennis Kelly and John Donnelly (writers) and Alex Lopez and Sam Donovan (directors). Utopia
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the operations of representations, particularly in terms of their power effects.107, 108 The
impossibility of suturing pandemic narratives indicates unassimilable excesses of
meaning whose representations should be identified and analyzed by scholars in terms
of those effects, rather than censored. Representations of crisis from the margins
signify underexamined and hegemonic andinstitutional power relations. A critical
crisis politics could be conceived as genealogical in the Foucauldian sense, as it aims
to disclose subjugated representations whose politics simply diverge from or,
alternatively, threaten preferred operationalizations of events, both past and future.
Such a genealogy would examine operations of the one and trace “failures” or
dislocations with the intent to disclose how excesses of meaning reveal unassimilable
crisis elements that challenge the hegemonic timeline enforced through “tertiary
spatialization.”109 Rather than ascertaining their truth status, the crisis genealogist
interprets dislocations as symptoms of institutional and symbolic failures of the one
to resonate with divergent expert interpretations and lived experiences. In sum, crisis
genealogies point to failures, dislocations in meaning and matter whose excavations
inescapably help transform the political terrain by opening up critique and dialogue
regarding the unassimilable horizonlessness, not totalization, of our selfunderstandings and political strivings.
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